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Abstract
This paper presents the “Game Theory Explorer” software tool to create and
analyze games as models of strategic interaction. A game in extensive or strate-
gic form is created and nicely displayed with a graphical user interface in a
web browser. State-of-the-art algorithms then compute all Nash equilibria of
the game after a mouseclick. In tutorial fashion, we present how the program is
used, and the ideas behind its main algorithms. We report on experiences with
the architecture of the software and its development as an open-source project.
Keywords Game theory, Nash equilibrium, scientific software
1 Introduction
Game theory provides mathematical concepts and tools for modeling and analyzing
interactive scenarios. In noncooperative game theory, the possible actions of the play-
ers are represented explicitly, together with payoffs that the players want to maximize
for themselves. Basic models are the extensive form represented by a game tree with
possible imperfect information represented by information sets, and the strategic (or
“normal”) form that lists the players’ strategies, which they choose independently,
together with a table of the players’ payoffs for each strategy profile.
The central concept for noncooperative games is the Nash equilibrium which pre-
scribes a strategy for each player that is optimal when the other players keep their
prescribed strategies fixed. Every finite game has an equilibrium when players are
allowed to mix (randomize) their actions (Nash, 1951). A game may have more than
one Nash equilibrium. Finding one or all Nash equilibria of a game is often a labori-
ous task.
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In this paper, we describe the Game Theory Explorer (GTE) software that allows
to create games in extensive or strategic form, and to compute their Nash equilib-
ria. GTE is primarily intended for the applied game theorist who is not an expert in
equilibrium computation, for example an experimental economist who designs exper-
iments to test if subjects play equilibrium strategies. The user can easily vary the pa-
rameters of the game-theoretic model, and study more complex games, because their
equilibrium analysis is quickly provided by the algorithm. The analysis of a game
with general mathematical parameters is also aided by knowing its equilibria for spe-
cific numerical values of those parameters. As our exposition will demonstrate, GTE
can also be used for more theoretical research in game theory, for example on strate-
gic stability (see Section 4). The ease of creating, displaying, and analyzing games
suggests GTE also as an educational tool for game theory.
Computing equilibria is a main research topic of the authors, and in later sections
we will explain some of our results on finding equilibria of two-player games in
strategic form (Avis et al., 2010) and extensive form based on the “sequence form”
(von Stengel, 1996). Scientific algorithms are often implemented as prototopes to
show that they work, as done, for example, by Audet et al. (2001), or von Stengel,
van den Elzen, and Talman (2002). However, providing a robust user interface to
create games is much more involved, and necessary to make such algorithms useful
for a wider research community. In particular, the drawing of game trees should
be done with a friendly graphical user interface (GUI) where the game tree can be
created and seen on the screen, and be stored, retrieved, and changed in an intuitive
manner. This is one of the purposes of the GTE software presented in this article.
An existing suite of software for game-theoretic analysis is Gambit (McKelvey,
McLennan, and Turocy, 2010). Gambit has been developed over the course of nearly
25 years and presents a library of solution algorithms, formats for storing games,
ways to program the creation of games with the help of the Python programming
language, and a GUI for creating game trees. It is open-source software that is free
to use and that can be extended by anyone. Given the mature state of Gambit and
the joint research interests and close contacts with its developers, it is clear that any
improvements offered by GTE should eventually be integrated into Gambit.
Other existing game solvers are GamePlan (Langlois, 2006) and XGame (Bel-
haiza, Mve, and Audet, 2010).
The main difference of GTE to Gambit is the provided access to the software and
the user interface. In terms of access, Gambit needs to be downloaded and installed;
it is offered on the main personal computing platforms Windows, Linux or Mac. Get-
ting the program to run may require some patience and technical experience with soft-
ware installions, which may present a “barrier to entry” for its use. In contrast, GTE is
started in a web browser via the web address http://www.gametheoryexplorer.
org. All interaction with the software is via the browser interface. The created games
and their output can be saved as files by the user on their local computer. This avoids
the technical hurdles of installing software on the user side, and simplifies updating
the software.
The graphical display of game trees in GTE is user-friendly and can be cus-
tomized, such as growing the tree in the vertical or horizontal direction. GTE can
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even be used just as a drawing tool for games, which can be exported as pictures to
file formats for use in papers or presentations.
Providing application software via the web has the following disadvantages com-
pared to installed software. First, a higher complexity of the program for the required
communication over the internet; however, manifold standard solutions are freely
available. Second, limited control over the user’s local computing resources for se-
curity reasons. This is an issue because equilibrium computation for larger games is
computationally intensive. For that reason, this computation takes place on the cen-
tral public server rather than the user’s client computer; we will explain the technical
issues in Section 7. Third, in our case, currently very limited use of the existing Gam-
bit software. We envisage a loosely coupled integration, in particular with Gambit’s
game solvers. GTE is very much under development in this respect.
We describe GTE, first from the perspective of the user, with an example in Sec-
tion 2, and the general creation of extensive and strategic-form games in Sections 3
and 4. We explain the main algorithms for finding all equilibria for games in strategic
form in Section 5, including issues for handling larger games where one has to restrict
oneself to finding sample equilibria (which, in particular, does not allow to decide if
the game has a unique equilibrium). For extensive games, the computation of behav-
ior strategies, which are exponentially less complex than mixed strategies, is outlined
in Section 6. The software architecture and the communication between server and
client computers is discussed, with as little technical jargon as possible, in Section 7.
In conclusion, we mention the difficulties of incentives and funding for implementing
user-friendly scientific software, and call for contributions of volunteers.
2 Example of using GTE
In this section we describe a simple 2×2 game, due to Bagwell (1995), together with
its “commitment” or “Stackelberg” variant which has more strategies. This game is
created and analyzed very simply with GTE, where we demonstrate the computed
equilibria. Our detailed analysis may also serve as a tutorial introduction to the basics
of noncooperative game theory. For a textbook on game theory see Osborne (2004).
A basic model of a noncooperative game is a game in strategic form. Each player
has a finite list of strategies. Players choose simultaneously a strategy each, which
defines a strategy profile, with a given payoff to each player. The strategic form is the
table of payoffs for all strategy profiles. For two players, the strategies of player 1
are the m rows and those of player 2 the n columns of a table, which in each cell
has a payoff pair. The two m×n matrices of payoffs to player 1 and 2 define such a
two-player game in strategic form, which is also called a bimatrix game.
Fig. 1 shows a 2× 2 game with the payoff to player 1 shown in the bottom left
corner and the payoff to player 2 in the top right corner of each cell. In GTE, such a
game is entered by giving the two payoff matrices (Fig. 13 shows the input screen for
a larger example), with a graphical display as shown at the top left of Fig. 1. At the
bottom left the same table is shown with a box around each payoff that is maximal
against the respective strategy of the other player (these boxes are currently not part
of GTE output). This shows that the bottom strategy B of player 1 is the only best
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Strategic form:
2 x 2 Payoff player 1
l r
T 5 3
B 6 4
2 x 2 Payoff player 2
l r
T 2 1
B 3 4
EE = Extreme Equilibrium, EP = Expected Payoffs
Rational:
EE 1 P1: (1) 0 1 EP= 4 P2: (1) 0 1 EP= 4
Decimal:
EE 1 P1: (1) 0 1.0 EP= 4.0 P2: (1) 0 1.0 EP= 4.0
Connected component 1:
{1} x {1}
Figure 1 Top left: Graphical output of a 2× 2 bimatrix game. Bottom left: Best response payoffs
surrounded by boxes (currently not part of GTE output). Right: Output of the computed equilibria of
this game.
response (payoff-maximizing strategy) against both columns l and r of player 2. For
player 2, the best responses are l against T and r against B.
In this game, strategy T is strictly dominated by B and can therefore be disre-
garded because it will never be played by player 1. The best response r against B
then defines the strategy profile (B,r) as the unique Nash equilibrium of the game,
that is, a pair of mutual best responses. The text output at the right of Fig. 1, which
pops up in a window after clicking a button that starts the equilibrium computation,
shows the two payoff matrices and the Nash equilibria. The equilibrium strategies are
shown as vectors of probabilities, both in rational output as exact fractions of integers
and in decimal. In this case there is only one equilibrium, which is the pair of vectors
(0,1) and (0,1) that describe the probabilities that player 1 plays his pure strategies
T and B and player 2 her strategies l and r, respectively. This pair of strategies also
defines the unique equilibrium component shown as {1} x {1}, an output which is
of more interest in the example of Fig. 3 below.
The game in Fig. 1 can also be represented in extensive form, as shown in Fig. 2
which is automatically generated by GTE. An extensive game is a game tree with
nodes as game states and outgoing edges as moves chosen by the player to move at
that node. Information sets, due to Kuhn (1953), describe a player’s lack of informa-
tion about the current game state and have the same outgoing moves at each node.
Here, player 2 is not informed about the move of player 1, in accordance with the
players’ simultaneous choice of moves in the strategic form.
4
3r ll r
T B
1
5 3
1
2
4
42
6
Figure 2 The game in Fig. 1 as an extensive game with an information set for player 2 who is
uninformed about the move of player 1.
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Figure 3 Left: Commitment version game of the game in Fig.s 1 and 2 where player 2 is informed
about the first move of player 1. Right: strategic form of this game as generated by GTE (except for
the boxes around the best-response payoffs).
The game in Fig. 1 is an example due to Bagwell (1995). It is a simple ver-
sion of a “Cournot” game. In the corresponding “Stackelberg” or commitment game,
player 1 is a leader who commits to his strategy, about which player 2, as a follower,
is informed. The game tree, and thus the game, is changed by becoming a game of
perfect information where each information set is a singleton.1 To change the game
in this way the information set is dissolved, which is a simple operation in GTE. The
new game tree is shown on the left in Fig. 3. Then the moves of player 2, who can
react to the choice of player 1, get new names, here at the right node a and b instead
of the original moves l and r at the original information set that remain the moves at
the left node of player 2.
A game tree with perfect information can be solved by “backward induction”
which defines a subgame perfect equilibrium or SPE, which is indeed a Nash equi-
librium. Here, player 2’s optimal moves are l and b, which defines her strategy lb.
1GTE does not show singleton information sets as ovals that contain a single node, only informa-
tion sets with two or more nodes.
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Given these choices of player 2, the optimal move of player 1 is T . This defines the
SPE (T, lb). In general, a strategy in an extensive game specifies a move at each
information set of the player, so player 2 has the four strategies la, lb, ra, rb listed
as columns in the strategic form on the right in Fig. 3, which is generated by GTE.
Because player 1 has only one information set given by the singleton that contains
the root node of the tree, his strategies are just the moves T and L. The SPE (T, lb)
is one of the cells in the strategic form with the two best-response payoffs 5 and 2
for the two players.
In a game tree with perfect information and different payoffs at each terminal
node, backward induction defines a unique SPE. However, the game has in general
additional Nash equilibria that are not subgame perfect. In this example, the strategy
pair (B,rb) is also an equilibrium, which can be seen from the strategic form. Here
player 2 chooses the right move r and b at both information sets, and the best response
of player 1 is then B, with payoffs 4 and 4 to the two players. This is an equilibrium
because neither player can unilaterally improve his or her payoff, under the crucial
assumption of equilibrium that the strategy of the other player stays fixed: When
player 1 chooses T instead of B and player 2 plays rb, then player 1 receives a payoff
of 3 rather than 4 and therefore prefers to stay with B. In turn, b is an optimal move
when player 1 chooses B. Player 2 cannot improve her payoff by changing from r
to l because that part of the game tree is not reached due to the move B by player 1.
This equilibrium is in effect the equilibrium (B,r) in the original simultaneous game
in Fig. 1 translated to the commitment game where player 2, even though she can
now react to the move of player 1, always chooses the equivalent of the original
move r. However, this equilibrium is not subgame perfect because it prescribes the
suboptimal move r in the subgame that starts with the left node of player 2.
In addition to these two pure-strategy equilibria, the game in Fig. 3 has additional
equilibria where player 2 makes a random choice at the node that is unreached due
to the move of player 1. Because the node is unreached, any choice of player 2 is
optimal because it has no effect on her payoffs, but that random choice must not
change the preference of player 1 for his move in order to keep the equilibrium prop-
erty. Move B of player 1, followed necessarily by move b of player 2, is optimal for
player 1 as long as his expected payoff for T is at most 4, which is the case when-
ever player 2 makes move r with probability at least 1/2. The two extreme cases
are the pure strategy equilibrium (B,rb) already discussed and the mixed strategy
equilibrium where player 1 chooses B and player 2 mixes between lb and rb with
probability 1/2 each. This is represented by the probability vector (0,1/2,0,1/2)
for the four strategies of player 2. Similarly, an equilibrium that has the same out-
come with payoffs 5 and 2 as the SPE but a suboptimal random choice between a
and b of player 2 is (T,(1/2,1/2,0,0)) where player mixes between la and lb with
probability 1/2 each; 1/2 is the largest probability that player 2 can assign to a so
that T stays a best response of player 1.
The preceding analysis is straightforward and simple, but a complete list of all
equilibria is nevertheless of interest. This is provided by GTE with the following
output:
Strategic form:
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2 x 4 Payoff player 1
la lb ra rb
T 5 5 3 3
B 6 4 6 4
2 x 4 Payoff player 2
la lb ra rb
T 2 2 1 1
B 3 4 3 4
EE = Extreme Equilibrium, EP = Expected Payoffs
Rational:
EE 1 P1: (1) 0 1 EP= 4 P2: (1) 0 1/2 0 1/2 EP= 4
EE 2 P1: (1) 0 1 EP= 4 P2: (2) 0 0 0 1 EP= 4
EE 3 P1: (2) 1 0 EP= 5 P2: (3) 0 1 0 0 EP= 2
EE 4 P1: (2) 1 0 EP= 5 P2: (4) 1/2 1/2 0 0 EP= 2
Decimal:
EE 1 P1: (1) 0 1.0 EP= 4.0 P2: (1) 0 0.5 0 0.5 EP= 4.0
EE 2 P1: (1) 0 1.0 EP= 4.0 P2: (2) 0 0 0 1.0 EP= 4.0
EE 3 P1: (2) 1.0 0 EP= 5.0 P2: (3) 0 1.0 0 0 EP= 2.0
EE 4 P1: (2) 1.0 0 EP= 5.0 P2: (4) 0.5 0.5 0 0 EP= 2.0
Connected component 1:
{1} x {1, 2}
Connected component 2:
{2} x {3, 4}
This output gives the four “extreme” equilibria described above, in both rational
and decimal description. Each equilibrium strategy of a player is preceded by an iden-
tifying number in parentheses such as (1) and (2) for the two strategies of player 1,
each of which appears in two equilibria. All four equilibrium strategies of player 2
are distinct, marked with (1) to (4). The connected components listed at the end of
the output show how these extreme equilibria can be arbitrarily combined: The first
connected component {1} x {1, 2} says that strategy (1) of player 1, which
is (0,1) (the pure strategy B), together with any convex combination of strategies (1)
and (2) of player 2, which are the strategies (0,1/2,0,1/2) and (0,0,0,1) (the latter
being the pure strategy rb), defines an equilibrium. This and the other connected
component {2} x {3, 4} describe the full set of Nash equilibria of the game.
In principle, GTE provides such a complete description of all equilibria for any
two-player game, except that the computation time, which is in general exponential
in the size of the game, may be prohibitively long for larger games.
3 Creating and analyzing extensive form games
In this section, we describe the construction in GTE of an extensive game which cor-
responds to the game of the previous section but where the first player’s commitment
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is imperfectly observed, as studied by Bagwell (2005). The game is created in five
stages: Drawing the raw tree, assigning players, combining nodes into information
sets, defining moves and chance probabilities, and setting payoffs. Graphical and
other more permanent settings, such as the orientation of the game tree, can also be
changed. After explaining the GUI operations, we consider the interesting equilib-
rium structure of the constructed game.
Figure 4 Constructing a tree in stages by clicking on nodes, as shown with the starting tree at the top
left, second stage at the top right, and final stage at the bottom. In this tree, every nonterminal node
has two children, but in general it may have any number of children.
The first stage of creating a new extensive game defines the tree structure, begin-
ning from a simple tree that has a root node with two children, as shown in Fig. 4.
Clicking on a leaf (terminal node) creates two children for that node, and clicking on
a nonterminal node creates an additional child.
1/2
 
2 2
 
1/2
 
 
1/2
1
  
2
 
1/2
 
2
  
Figure 5 Choosing the player to move for each node. The square nodes are chance nodes, with
initially uniform probabilities for the outgoing edges.
8
The next stage is to select players, by selecting a “player assignment” button for
each player, where the name of the player can also be changed, for example to “Alice”
and “Bob” instead of the defaults “1” and “2” (which we have not done). Clicking on
a nonterminal node then asigns the player (originally unassigned with a black node),
for example player 2 for the four nonterminal nodes closest to the leaves in Fig. 5.
Assigning a chance node, represented by a black square, defines per default uniform
probabilities on the outgoing edges, which can be changed. All nonterminal nodes
have to be assigned a player before the next stage can be reached. It is possible to
go back to a previous stage at any time, here to alter the tree structure by adding or
deleting nodes.
1/2
 
2
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Figure 6 Creating information sets, which are automatically drawn so as to minimize the number of
crossing edges.
The next stage is to create information sets by clicking on two nodes (or informa-
tion sets) of the same player, which are then merged into a single information set. It is
necessary that the respective nodes have the same number of children because these
will be the moves at the newly created information set. When an information set is
created, the program adjusts, as far as possible, the levels of nodes in the tree so that
all nodes in the information set are at the same level and the information set appears
horizontally (if the game tree grows in the vertical direction, otherwise vertically as
in Fig. 11). In addition, crossings between edges and information sets are minimized.
Fig. 6 shows the resulting game tree, which at this stage has its final shape, except for
the definition of moves and payoffs.
Figure 7 Browser headline bar that guides through the stages of creating a game tree, here indicating
the “information set” creation stage.
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Fig. 7 shows a “headline bar” that indicates the current stage of the creation of the
game tree, which defines either the tree, the players, the information sets, the moves,
or the payoffs. The location of the headline bar relative to the entire browser window
can be seen in Fig. 11. In Fig. 7, the current stage is that of creating information sets.
Underneath the stage indicator are buttons that define the mode of operation for the
computer mouse. The default mode at the “information set” stage is that of merging
two nodes (more generally the information set that they are currently contained in)
into a larger information set. The two other mode buttons at this stage are to dissolve
an information set into singletons, or (indicated by the scissors) to cut it into two
smaller sets.
The default mode for the earlier “tree” stage is to add children to a node (indicated
by the ⊕ sign). The alternative mode button (with the 	 sign) is to delete a node and
all its descendants. At the “players” stage, the mode buttons correspond to the player
(including chance) to be assigned to the node when clicking on the node.
b
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1/100
3 6
431
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1
3
2
rl
T
4
1/100
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b
4
2
5
2
6
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B
Figure 8 The final game tree after adding moves, modified chance probabilities, and payoffs.
Fig. 8 shows the game tree after the completed stages of assigning moves (and
chance probabilities) and payoffs, which work as follows. When the “moves” stage
is chosen in the headline bar, all outgoing edges at an information set get unique pre-
assigned names from a list by traversing the tree in “breadth-first” manner. Per default
these are the upper-case letters in alphabetical order for player 1 and the lower-case
letters for player 2. There are two ways to change these default move names: First, by
clicking on a move label, which allows to enter an alternative name via the keyboard;
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this is not restricted to a single letter and need not be unique. On the left in Fig. 9, this
is shown for the chance probability of the right chance move which is changed from
1/2 to 0.99 (which could also be entered as 99/100). The remaining probability for
the other chance move is automatically set to 0.01 so that the probabilities sum to
one. A second, quick way to change all move names is the mode button below the
“players” stage in the headline bar where all move names for a player are entered at
once, or altered from the displayed current list; this is shown in the right picture of
Fig. 9 for player 2 whose default moves a,b,c,d are changed to l,r,a,b.
Figure 9 Changing move names, either by clicking on a single move name or chance probability
(left), or by changing all moves of a player at once (right).
At the final “payoffs” stage, the leaves of the tree get payoffs to the two players,
which are at first consecutively given as 0,1,2, . . . in order to have a unique payoff to
identify each leaf. As shown in Fig. 10, a player’s payoffs can then be changed at once
by replacing them with the intended payoffs for the game, where the numbering helps
to identify the leaves. Payoffs can also be changed individually. In addition, payoffs
can be generated randomly. A zero-sum option can be chosen which automatically
sets the other player’s payoff to the negative of the payoff to the current player.
Figure 10 Changing all payoffs of player 1 from the pre-set values 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (for easy identifi-
cation) to their intended values.
The game tree is stored as its logical structure. Its graphical layout is generated
automatically. Its parameters can be changed, such as the orientation of the game
tree, which can grow vertically or horizontally in either direction, the default being
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top-down. Fig. 11 shows a change of settings so that the game tree grows from left to
right. Other parameters such as the colors used for the players, line thickness, fonts,
and other dimensions can also be changed.
Figure 11 Changing the graphics settings, in this case to a left-to-right tree orientation and a Hel-
vetica font.
Fig. 11 also shows the general layout of the graphical interface in the web browser.
The top left offers file manipulation functions such as starting a new game, storing
and loading the current game (together with its settings), and exporting it to a picture
format (.png) and a scalable graphics format (.fig) that can be further manipulated
with the xfig drawing program and converted to .pdf or .eps files for inclusion in
documents. On the top right various solution algorithms can be selected and started,
and at the very right zoom operations and change of settings can be selected.
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Figure 12 Strategic form of the game in Fig. 8.
The game in Fig. 8 has an interesting equilibrium structure. It is due to Bag-
well (1995) and represents the commitment game shown earlier in Fig. 3, but where
the commitment of player 1 is imperfectly observed due to some transmission noise:
Namely, with a small probability (here 0.01), the second player observes the commit-
ment incorrectly as the opposite move, which is represented by the chance moves and
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the two information sets of player 2. The resulting strategic form is shown in Fig. 12.
Finding all equilibria with GTE gives the following output, with three equilibria that
are isolated, each in a separate component.
Strategic form:
2 x 4 Payoff player 1
la lb ra rb
T 5 249/50 151/50 3
B 6 201/50 299/50 4
2 x 4 Payoff player 2
la lb ra rb
T 2 199/100 101/100 1
B 3 399/100 301/100 4
EE = Extreme Equilibrium, EP = Expected Payoffs
Rational:
EE 1 P1: (1) 1/100 99/100 EP= 393/98 P2: (1) 0 25/49 0 24/49 EP= 397/100
EE 2 P1: (2) 0 1 EP= 4 P2: (2) 0 0 0 1 EP= 4
EE 3 P1: (3) 99/100 1/100 EP= 489/98 P2: (3) 24/49 25/49 0 0 EP= 201/100
Decimal:
EE 1 P1: (1) 0.01 0.99 EP= 4.0102 P2: (1) 0 0.5102 0 0.4898 EP= 3.97
EE 2 P1: (2) 0 1.0 EP= 4.0 P2: (2) 0 0 0 1.0 EP= 4.0
EE 3 P1: (3) 0.99 0.01 EP= 4.9898 P2: (3) 0.4898 0.5102 0 0 EP= 2.01
Connected component 1:
{1} x {1}
Connected component 2:
{2} x {2}
Connected component 3:
{3} x {3}
In particular, the original SPE (T, lb) of the commitment game with perfect ob-
servation and payoffs 5 and 2 has disappeared. Because the game does not have any
nontrivial subgames (which are subtrees where each player knows that they are in
the subgame), the concepts of subgame perfection and backward induction no longer
apply in the game with imperfectly observable commitment in Fig. 8. The reason
why (T, lb) is no longer an equilibrium is the following. Because player 1 commits
to move T with certainty, player 2 should choose move l when seeing T , because this
gives her a higher payoff than r. However, when player 2 sees move B of player 1, it
must be due to an error in the observation and player 2 would therefore also choose
a rather than b; in short, la and not lb is a best response to T . However, (T, la) is
not an equilibrium either because against lb player 1 would choose B; in a sense,
player 1 would exploit the fact that player 2 interprets B as an erroneous signal. This,
however, seems to imply that player 1 has lost his commitment power due to the noise
in the observation.
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A Bagwell (1995) pointed out, and as is shown in the above list of equilibria, this
loss of commitment power only applies when the players are restricted to use pure
strategies. There is in fact a mixed equilibrium, listed as the component {3} x {3} ,
which has payoffs 489/98 and 201/100 to the two players that are close to the
“Stackelberg” payoffs 5 and 2 when no noise is present. Here player 1 himself adds a
small amount of noise to the commitment and plays T and B with probabilities 0.99
and 0.01. In turn, player 2 mixes between la and lb with probabilities 24/49 and
25/49. That is, player 2 chooses l with certainty and is indifferent between a and b
because when she sees move B, this signal may equally likely be received due to the
chance move or due to player 1’s randomization. The mixture between a and b is
such that player 1 in turn is indifferent between T and B. The game also has the pure
strategy equilibrium (B,rb) as before, listed as {2} x {2} with payoffs 4 and 4,
and another mixed equilibrium {1} x {1} with similar payoffs.
With GTE, the game in Fig. 8 is created in a few minutes, and the equilibria are
computed instantly. The game does not allow abstract parameters, such as ε for the
error probability as in the analysis by Bagwell (1995), which is here chosen as 0.01.
However, as a quick way to test a typical case of this game-theoretic model, GTE is
a valuable tool.
4 Examples of analyzing games in strategic form
In this section we give examples of strategic-form games analyzed with GTE. These
also demonstrate the use of GTE as a research tool for game theory, for questions on
the possible number of equilibria, or the description of equilibrium components in
the context of strategic stability.
Figure 13 GTE input of a 6×6 game in strategic form.
Fig. 13 shows the input of a game in strategic form, currently implemented for two
players only. For each player one needs to specify the number of strategies, which
are the rows for player 1 and columns for player 2, and a payoff matrix. Names for
the strategies are generated automatically as upper case letters for player 1 and lower
case letters for player 2, and can be changed. If the strategic form has been generated
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from the extensive form, then the strategies are shown as tuples of moves, one for
each information set.
One can choose a zero-sum input mode where the payoffs to player 2 are auto-
matically the negative of the payoffs to player 1. Similarly, one can input a symmetric
game where the square payoff matrices to player 1 and 2 are a matrix A and its trans-
pose A>; the game is symmetric because it does not change when the players are
exchanged. In both cases, only the payoff matrix of player 1 is entered.
Payoffs can be entered as integers, fractions, or with a decimal point where the
display can be switched between fractions and decimals; internally they are all stored
as fractions. The “Align and Update” button aligns the entries in columns and updates
the second player’s payoffs for zero-sum and symmetric games.
The input of bimatrix games and the computation of their equilibria has the func-
tionality of the popular webpage of Savani (2005) which has been used tens of thou-
sands of times. The extra feature in GTE is the graphical output as in Fig. 12, for
example, which is accessed by the “Matrix Layout” tab shown at the top of Fig. 13.
The game in Fig. 13 has 75 equilibria, listed as follows; the output displays each
equilibrium in a single line, which we have here broken into two lines, one per player,
to fit the page.
EE 1 P1: (1) 1/30 1/6 3/10 3/10 1/6 1/30 EP= 3/2
P2: (1) 1/6 1/30 3/10 3/10 1/30 1/6 EP= 3/2
EE 2 P1: (2) 0 0 1/33 5/33 4/11 5/11 EP= 24/11
P2: (2) 0 0 5/33 1/33 5/11 4/11 EP= 24/11
EE 3 P1: (3) 1/128 0 0 7/64 47/128 33/64 EP= 12/7
P2: (3) 0 0 5/21 13/189 59/189 8/21 EP= 297/128
...
EE 74 P1: (74) 0 0 13/32 0 0 19/32 EP= 450/103
P2: (74) 33/103 70/103 0 0 0 0 EP= 477/16
EE 75 P1: (75) 0 0 0 0 1 0 EP= 270
P2: (75) 1 0 0 0 0 0 EP= 270
Connected component 1:
{1} x {1}
...
Connected component 75:
{75} x {75}
This game is the smallest known example that refutes a conjecture by Quint and
Shubik (1995) that an n×n game has at most 2n−1 equilibrium components, here for
n = 6. It has been constructed by von Stengel (1999) using methods from polytope
theory, with the specific small integers in Fig. 13 described by Savani and von Stengel
(2004, p. 25). Studying games with large numbers of equilibria is obviously greatly
aided by computational tools; for another example see von Stengel (2012).
Fig. 14 shows at the top left a symmetric “anti-coordination” game where the only
nonzero payoffs are −1 to both players on the diagonal. Because no payoff is posi-
tive, any cell with payoff zero to both players is an equilibrium, and these equilibria
are connected by line segments to form a “ring” that defines the topologically con-
nected component 2 as in the output shown on the right in Fig. 14. The game also has
an isolated completely mixed equilibrium shown as component 1. Interestingly, only
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EE 1 P1: (1) 1/3 1/3 1/3 EP= -1/3 P2: (1) 1/3 1/3 1/3 EP= -1/3
EE 2 P1: (2) 1 0 0 EP= 0 P2: (2) 0 1 0 EP= 0
EE 3 P1: (2) 1 0 0 EP= 0 P2: (3) 0 0 1 EP= 0
EE 4 P1: (3) 0 1 0 EP= 0 P2: (3) 0 0 1 EP= 0
EE 5 P1: (3) 0 1 0 EP= 0 P2: (4) 1 0 0 EP= 0
EE 6 P1: (4) 0 0 1 EP= 0 P2: (4) 1 0 0 EP= 0
EE 7 P1: (4) 0 0 1 EP= 0 P2: (2) 0 1 0 EP= 0
Connected component 1:
{1} x {1}
Connected component 2:
{2, 4} x {2}
{3, 4} x {4}
{4} x {2, 4}
{2, 3} x {3}
{3} x {3, 4}
{2} x {2, 3}
----------------------------------------------------------------
EE 1 P1: (1) 1/3 1/3 1/3 EP= -3/10 P2: (1) 1/3 1/3 1/3 EP= -3/10
Connected component 1:
{1} x {1}
Figure 14 Top left: 3×3 game which has two equilibrium components, shown on the right. Bottom
left: The same game but with perturbed payoffs so that only component 1 remains (see bottom right).
component 1 is strategically stable in the sense that there is always an equilibrium
nearby when the payoffs are slightly perturbed. In the game shown at the bottom left,
the payoffs are perturbed so that the only equilibrium that remains is the completely
mixed equilibrium in component 1; the perturbations from zero to 0.1 can be changed
to independent arbitrarily small positive reals with the same effect.
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EE 1 P1: (1) 0 1 0 EP= 0 P2: (1) 0 1 0 EP= 0
EE 2 P1: (1) 0 1 0 EP= 0 P2: (2) 0 0 1 EP= 0
EE 3 P1: (2) 1 0 0 EP= 0 P2: (3) 1 0 0 EP= 0
EE 4 P1: (2) 1 0 0 EP= 0 P2: (2) 0 0 1 EP= 0
EE 5 P1: (3) 0 0 1 EP= 0 P2: (3) 1 0 0 EP= 0
EE 6 P1: (3) 0 0 1 EP= 0 P2: (1) 0 1 0 EP= 0
Connected component 1:
{1, 3} x {1}
{2, 3} x {3}
{3} x {1, 3}
{1, 2} x {2}
{2} x {2, 3}
{1} x {1, 2}
Figure 15 3×3 game which has only a “ring” of equilibria as its sole stable component, shown on
the right.
The concept of strategic stability is due to Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). Fig. 15
shows a game that is also symmetric like that at the top left of Fig. 14 (the symmetry
is easy to see due to the staggered payoffs in the lower left and upper right of each
cell). It is strategically equivalent (by subtracting constants from columns of the
row player’s payoffs and from rows of the column player’s payoffs) to the game of
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986, p. 1034) and has a “ring” consisting of line segments
as its only equilibrium component. As Kohlberg and Mertens have shown, any point
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on that ring can be chosen so that a suitably perturbed game has its only equilibrium
near that point, which can be verified by experimenting with numeric perturbations
of the game. Correspondingly, the entire ring defines the minimal stable component
of the game.
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EE 1 P1: (1) 0 0 0 1 EP= 0 P2: (1) 31/282 5/141 241/282 EP= 0
EE 2 P1: (1) 0 0 0 1 EP= 0 P2: (2) 0 3/4 1/4 EP= 0
EE 3 P1: (1) 0 0 0 1 EP= 0 P2: (3) 0 1 0 EP= 0
EE 4 P1: (1) 0 0 0 1 EP= 0 P2: (4) 3/4 1/4 0 EP= 0
EE 5 P1: (1) 0 0 0 1 EP= 0 P2: (5) 1/2 0 1/2 EP= 0
EE 6 P1: (1) 0 0 0 1 EP= 0 P2: (6) 11/16 0 5/16 EP= 0
EE 7 P1: (2) 1 0 0 0 EP= 5 P2: (7) 1 0 0 EP= 4
Connected component 1:
{1} x {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
Connected component 2:
{2} x {7}
c
a b
Figure 16 Left: 4×3 game with two equilibrium components, shown on the right. In component 1,
player 1 plays D and player 2 plays so that player 1 gets at most payoff 0, shown by the hexagon at the
bottom right (see also Hauk and Hurkens, 2002, Fig. 4). Component 2 is the pure-strategy equilibrium
(A,a).
Fig. 16 shows another game related to strategic stability, due to Hauk and Hurkens
(2002, p. 74). This game corresponds to an extensive game where player 1 can first
choose between an “outside option” D with constant payoff zero to both players or
else play in a 3×3 simultaneous game. The game has two equilibrium components,
the pure equilibrium (A,a) and the outside option component where player 2 ran-
domizes in such a way that player 1 gets at most payoff zero and therefore will not
deviate from D.
Interestingly, the larger component in this game has the property that it has index
zero but is nevertheless strategically stable, that is, any perturbed game has equilibria
near that component, as shown by Hauk and Hurkens (2002). The larger component
in the game in Fig. 14 has also index zero and is not stable, which is what one would
normally expect. The index is a certain integer defined for an equilibrium component,
with the important property that the sum over all equilibrium indices is one, and that
for generic perturbations each equilibrium has index 1 or −1, which is always 1 for a
pure-strategy equilibrium (see Shapley, 1974). A symbolic computation of the index
of an equilibrium component for a bimatrix game is described by Balthasar (2009,
Chapter 2). Its implementation is planned as a future additional feature of GTE.
All currently implemented algorithms of GTE apply only to two-player games. A
simple next stage is to allow three or more players at least for the purpose of drawing
games and generating their strategic form. Algorithms for finding all equilibria of a
game with any number of players using polynomial algebra are described by Datta
(2010); some of these require computer algebra packages, so far not part of GTE.
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5 Equilibrium computation for games in strategic form
In this section, we describe the algorithm used in GTE that finds all equilibria of a
two-player game in strategic form. This algorithm searches the vertices of certain
polyhedra defined by the payoff matrices, which is practical for up to about 20 strate-
gies per player. For larger games, one can normally still find in reasonable time one
equilibrium, or possibly several equilibria with varying starting points, using the path-
following algorithms by Lemke and Howson (1964) and Lemke (1965) mentioned at
the end of this section. We assume some familiarity with pivoting as used in the
simplex algorithm for linear programming, which in the present context is explained
further in Avis et al. (2010).
The best response condition describes, in a general finite game in strategic form,
when a profile of mixed strategies is a Nash equilibrium. If player 1, say, has m
pure strategies, then his set X of mixed strategies is the set of probability vectors
x = (x1, . . . ,xm) so that xi ≥ 0 and ∑mi=1 xi = 1. Geometrically, X is a simplex which
is the convex hull of the m unit vectors in Rm . If x is part of a Nash equilibrium, then x
has to be a best response against the strategies of the other players. The best response
condition states that this is the case if and only if every pure strategy i so that xi > 0 is
such a best response (the condition is easy to see and was used by Nash, 1951). This
is a finite condition, which requires to compute player 1’s expected payoff for each
pure strategy i, and to check if the strategies i in the support {i | xi > 0} of x give
indeed maximal payoff. These maximal payoffs have to be equal, and the resulting
equations typically determine the probabilities of the mixed strategies of the other
players.
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2 EE 1 P1: (1) 1 0 EP= 1 P2: (1) 1 0 EP= 3
EE 2 P1: (1) 1 0 EP= 1 P2: (2) 1/2 1/2 EP= 3
EE 3 P1: (2) 0 1 EP= 2 P2: (3) 0 1 EP= 2
Connected component 1:
{1} x {1, 2}
Connected component 2:
{2} x {3}
Figure 17 A “threat game” in extensive form, its 2× 2 strategic form, and its equilibrium compo-
nents.
For two players, these constraints define “best response polyhedra” that simplify
the search for equilibria. We illustrate this geometric apprach with an example; for
a general exposition and detailed references see von Stengel (2002; 2007). Fig. 17
shows a simple game tree which has the SPE (B,r), and another equilibrium compo-
nent where player 2 “threatens” to choose l with probability at least 1/2 and player 1
chooses T .
Fig. 18 shows on the left the mixed strategy y of player 2, which is defined by the
probability that she chooses move r, say, together with the expected payoff to player 1
for his two pure strategies T and B. These expected payoffs are linear functions of
y (because the game has only two players; for more than two players, the expected
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Figure 18 Expected payoffs to the two players in the threat game in Fig. 17 as a function of the
mixed strategy of the other player.
payoff for a pure strategy of player 1 is a product of mixed strategy probabilities of
the other players, which is no longer linear). The right picture shows the expected
payoffs for the pure strategies l and r of player 2 as a function of the mixed strategy
of player 1.
These pictures show when a pure strategy is a best response against a mixed
strategy of the other player: T is a best response of player 1 when prob(r) ≤ 1/2,
and B is a best response when prob(r)≥ 1/2. Strategy r of player 2 is always a best
response, and l is a best response when prob(B) = 0.
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Figure 19 The polyhedra Q and P in (1) that define the “upper envelope” of the payoffs in Fig. 18,
with additional circled facet labels for unplayed strategies, and equilibrium strategy pairs.
In Fig. 19, the same pictures are shown more abstractly where u and v are the
expected payoffs to player 1 and 2, respectively, which are required to be at least
as large as the expected payoff for every pure strategy. In a general m× n bimatrix
game, let ai j and bi j be the payoffs to player 1 and 2, respectively, for each pure
strategy pair i, j. Analogous to X , let Y be the mixed strategy simplex of player 2
given by Y = {y ∈ Rn | y j ≥ 0, ∑nj=1 y j = 1}. Then P and Q are the best response
polyhedra
P = {(x,v) ∈ X×R | ∑mi=1 bi jxi ≤ v, 1≤ j ≤ n},
Q = {(y,u) ∈ Y ×R | ∑nj=1 ai jy j ≤ u, 1≤ i≤ m}. (1)
In Fig. 19, Q is shown on the left and refers to the set of mixed strategies y of player 2
together with the best responses of player 1 and corresponding payoff u to player 1.
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Consider one of the inequalities ∑nj=1 ai jy j ≤ u in the definition of Q for some pure
strategy i of player 1, which in the example is either T or B. When this inequality
is tight, that is, holds as equality, then i is clearly a best response to y. This tight
inequality defines a face (intersection with a valid hyperplane) of the polyhedron, and
is often a facet (a face of maximum dimension), as here for both strategies T and B;
however, for the polyhedron P on the right in Fig. 19 the tight inequality ∑mi=1 bi jxi =
v when j is the pure strategy l of player 2 does not define a facet because it only holds
for the single point where prob(B) = 0 and v = 3, that is, for (x,v) = ((1,0),3) ∈ P.
We label each point (y,u) of Q with the strategy i of player 1 whenever i is a best
response to y, that is, when ∑nj=1 ai jy j = u. In addition, (y,u) is labeled with strategy
j of player 2 if y j = 0. The labels for these unplayed pure strategies are shown with
circles around them in Fig. 19. So any point ((1,0),u) where prob(r) = 0 (the left
edge of Q) is labeled with r, and any point ((0,1),u) where prob(r) = 1 and hence
prob(l) = 0 (the right edge of Q) is labeled with l . Similarly, in the right picture the
left and right edges of P have label B and T , respectively. The bottom edge of P is
labeled with the pure strategy r, and the left vertex (x,v) = ((1,0),3) has label l in
addition to the labels B and r.
With this labeling, an equilibrium (x,y) of the game with payoffs u and v to player
1 and 2 is given by a pair ((x,v),(y,u)) in P×Q that is completely labeled, that is,
each pure strategy, here T,B, l,r, of either player appears as a label of (x,v) or (y,u).
Otherwise, a missing label represents a pure strategy that has positive probability but
is not a best response, which does not hold in an equilibrium because it contradicts
the best response condition.
In Fig. 19, one equilibrium (x,y), indicated by the small disks to mark the two
points (x,v) and (y,u), is given by x = y = (0,1) with u = v = 2, which is the pure
strategy pair (B,r). Here the point (y,u) of Q has labels B and l and the point (x,v)
of P has labels r and T , so these two points together have all labels T,B, l,r. A second
equilibrium component, indicated by the rectangles, is given by any point (y,u) on
the entire edge of Q that has label T and (x,v) = ((1,0),3) in P which has the three
labels r, l,B. These are also the two equilibrium components in the GTE output in
Fig. 17. The edge of Q with label T is the convex hull of the two vertices ((1,0),1)
with labels T and r, and ((1/2,1/2),1) with labels T and B. Each of these vertices
of Q, together with the vertex ((1,0),3) of P, forms a completely labeled vertex pair.
For these two vertex pairs of P×Q, one label (r or B) appears twice and represents a
best-response pure strategy that is played with probability zero, which is allowed in
equilibrium.
The extreme equilibria computed by GTE are in fact all vertex pairs of P×Q
that are completely labeled, which are then further processed so as to detect the equi-
librium components. We give an outline of how these computations work in GTE,
described in detail and compared with other approaches by Avis et al. (2010).
Vertex enumeration, that is, listing all vertices of a polyhedron defined by linear
inequalities, is a well-studied problem where we use the lexicographic reverse search
method lrs by Avis (2000; 2006). This method reverses the steps of the simplex
algorithm for linear programming for a certain deterministic pivoting rule. It starts
with a vertex v0 of the polyhedron and a linear objective function that is maximized
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at that vertex. The simplex algorithm for maximizing this linear function computes
from every vertex a path of pivoting steps to v0 . With a deterministic pivoting rule,
that path is unique. In lrs, the pivoting rule chooses as entering variable the variable
with the least index (i.e., smallest subscript) that improves the objective function, and
the leaving variable via a lexicographic rule. The unique paths of simplex steps from
the vertices to v0 define a tree with root v0 . The lrs algorithm explores this tree by
traversing the tree edges in the reverse direction using a depth-first search.
In lrs, as in the simplex algorithm, the vertices of P×Q are represented by basic
feasible solutions to the inequalities in (1) when they are represented in equality form
via slack variables. Here, these are vectors s in Rn and r in Rm so that the constraints
that define P and Q are written as
m
∑
i=1
bi jxi + s j = v, ri +
n
∑
j=1
ai jy j = u, xi,s j,ri,y j ≥ 0 (2)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and ∑ni=1 xi = 1 and ∑nj=1 y j = 1 so that x ∈ X and y ∈ Y .
A feasible solution x,s,v,r,y,u to (2) defines a point in P×Q and vice versa. A tight
inequality corresponds to a slack variable that is zero. In fact, the labels for a strategy
pair x,y, where u and v are chosen minimally so that (2) holds, which determines r
and s, are the pure strategies i so that xi = 0 or ri = 0 for player 1 and y j = 0 or s j = 0
for player 2. The equilibrium condition of being completely labeled is equivalent to
the complementarity condition
xi ri = 0 (1≤ i≤ m), y j s j = 0 (1≤ j ≤ n). (3)
In a basic feasible solution to (2), the labels correspond to the indices i or j of the
nonbasic variables, and to basic variables that happen to have value zero.
Basic solutions where basic variables have value zero are called degenerate, and
games where this happens are also called degenerate. It is easy to see (see von Sten-
gel, 2002) that this corresponds to a mixed strategy of a player that has more best
responses than the size of its support; in terms of labels, this defines a point of P
with more than m labels or a point of Q with more than n labels. An example is
the degenerate game in Fig. 17 where the pure strategy T (which is a mixed strat-
egy x = (1,0) with a support of size one) has two best responses, which is the point
((1,0),3) of P in Fig. 19 with three labels B, l,r. For extensive games, the strategic
form is typically degenerate, as the examples in Fig. 3 and 17 demonstrate. In lrs,
all arithmetic computations are done in arbitrary precision arithmetic (rather than
floating point arithmetic with possible rounding errors) in order to recognize with
certainty that a basic variable is zero. In addition, lrs uses the economical integer
pivoting method where basic feasible solutions are represented with integers rather
than rational numbers; see, for example, von Stengel (2007, Section 3.5).
After enumerating all vertices of P and Q with lrs, those pairs that fulfill the
complementarity condition (3) are the extreme equilibria of the game. Avis et al.
(2010) also describe an improved method lrsNash, which is used in GTE, where only
the vertices of one polytope, say P, are generated, and the set L of labels missing
from each such vertex (x,v) is used to identify the face Q(L) of the other polytope
that has exactly the labels in L. If this face is not empty, then each of its vertices
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(y,u) defines an extreme equilibrium (x,y). An alternative method to enumerate all
extreme equilibria is the EEE method of Audet et al. (2001) which performs a depth-
first search that chooses one tight inequality for either player in each search step. In
Avis et al. (2010), EEE is implemented with exact integer arithmetic and compared
with lrsNash, and performs better for larger games from size 15×15 onwards.
Given the list of extreme equilibria, the set of all equilibria is completely de-
scribed as follows (for details see Avis et al., 2010). Consider the bipartite graph
R with edges (x,y) that are the extreme equilibria. Each connected component C
of this graph defines a topologically connected component of equilibria, as it is out-
put by GTE. For each C, identify the maximal bipartite “cliques” in R of the form
U ×V ⊆ C, that is, every pair (x,y) in U ×V is an extreme equilibrium. Then any
convex combination of U paired with any convex combination of V is also a Nash
equilibrium, and every equilibrium of the game can be represented in this way. There
may be several such cliques that define a component C, as in Fig. 14 and 15 above.
In GTE, the maximal cliques U×V are computed with an extension of the fast clique
enumeration algorithm by Bron and Kerbosch (1973).
For a two-player game in strategic form, GTE computes by default all Nash equi-
libria, as just described. However, the state-of-the-art algorithms lrsNash and EEE
have exponential running time due the typically exponential growth of the number
of vertices of P×Q. These equilibrium enumeration algorithms therefore take pro-
hibitively long for games with more than 25, certainly 30 pure strategies for each
player. In addition, it is NP-hard to decide if a bimatrix game has more than one
Nash equilibrium (Gilboa and Zemel, 1989; Conitzer and Sandholm, 2008), so one
cannot expect to answer that question quickly for larger games.
In practice, a finite game may represent a discretization of an infinite game, where
it may be useful to know its equilibria when each player has several hundred strate-
gies. In that case, it is still possible to use methods that find one equilibrium, such
as the classic algorithm by Lemke and Howson (1964). This is a path-following al-
gorithm that follows a sequence of pivoting steps, similar to the simplex algorithm
for linear programming (for expositions see Shapley, 1974, or von Stengel, 2002;
2007). Like the simplex algorithm, it can take exponentially many steps on certain
worst-case instances (Savani and von Stengel, 2006). However, these seem to be rare
in practice, and the algorithm is typically fast for random games.
The Lemke–Howson algorithm has a free parameter, which is a pure strategy of
a player that together with the best response to that strategy defines a “starting point”
of the algorithm in the space of mixed strategies X ×Y . Varying this starting point
over all pure strategies may lead to different equilibria (however, if that is not the
case, the game may still have equilibria that are elusive to the algorithm).
GTE uses a related but different method that is implemented using the algorithm
by Lemke (1965), which allows for starting points that can be arbitrary mixed strategy
pairs (x,y) (von Stengel, van den Elzen, and Talman, 2002). In addition, the compu-
tation can be interpreted as the “tracing procedure” by Harsanyi and Selten (1988),
where players’ strategies are best responses to a weighted combination of their prior
(x,y) and the actual strategies that they are playing. Initially, the players only react to
the prior, whose weight is then decreased; equilibrium is reached when the weight of
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the prior becomes zero. If starting from sufficiently many random priors gives always
the same equilibrium, this does not prove that this equilibrium is unique, but may be
considered as sufficient reason to suggest this as a plausible way to play the game.
The computational experiments of von Stengel, van den Elzen, and Talman (2002)
show that for random games, the method finds an equilibrium in a small number
of pivoting steps, and that typically many equilibria are found by varying the prior
by choosing it uniformly at random from the strategy simplices. For a systematic
investigation of this method in GTE, it would be useful to generate larger games as
discretizations of games defined by arithmetic formulas for payoff functions; this is
a future programming project where a closer integration with Gambit is envisaged.
6 Equilibrium computation for games in extensive form
The standard approach to finding equilibria of an extensive game is to convert it to
strategic form, and to apply the corresponding algorithms. However, the number of
pure strategies grows typically exponentially in the size of the game tree. In contrast,
the sequence form is a strategic description that has the same size as the game tree,
which is used in GTE. We sketch the main ideas here; for more details see von
Stengel (1996; 2002) or von Stengel, van den Elzen, and Talman (2002).
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Figure 20 Extensive game with perfect information for player 2 and no information for player 1.
Fig. 20 shows an extensive game where player 1 has four moves at the root and
two moves at his second information set. Player 2 has perfect information and four
singleton information sets with two moves each. A pure strategy of a player defines a
move for every information set, so player 1 has 8 and player 2 has 16 pure strategies.
Some of these pure strategies can be identified because they describe the same “plan”
of playing the game. A reduced pure strategy does not specify a move at an infor-
mation set that is unreached due to an earlier own move of the player. For example,
after move a player 2 does not need to specify move g or h because the information
set with that move cannot be reached. We represent such an unspecified move by
an asterisk “ * ” at the place where the move would be listed, so a*ce is a reduced
strategy where * stands for either g or h, as in the strategy bgce where no reduction
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is possible. The reduced strategic form is shown in Fig. 21, which is a 5×12 game.
Each cell shows the payoffs that result when the two strategies meet.
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Figure 21 Reduced strategic form of the game in Fig. 20. In a reduced strategy, any move at an
information set that cannot be reached due to an earlier own move is left unspecified and replaced
by “ * ”.
In this game, a mixed strategy requires four independent probabilities for player 1
(the fifth is then determined because probabilities sum to one) and eleven for player 2.
In general, the number of reduced strategies is exponential in the size of the game tree,
so there is a large number of mixed strategy probabilities to compute.
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Figure 22 Sequence form payoffs of the game in Fig. 20. All empty cells have zero entries. The rows
are played with a probability distribution, whereas the columns are played with weights yσ subject to
the equations y /0 = 1 = ya + ybg + ybh = yc + yd = ye + y f .
The sequence form is a compact strategic description of the game that has the
same size as the game tree. Instead of strategies, it uses sequences of moves of a given
player along a path from the root to a leaf. The payoff matrices are sparse and contain
payoffs for those pairs of sequences of the two players that lead to a leaf, as shown
in Fig. 22 for the game in Fig. 20. This table is evidently more compact, and vastly
more so for larger games. In this game, sequences and reduced strategies coincide
for player 1, because that player does not get any information about the moves of
the other player. For player 2, her sequences σ are played with probabilities yσ that
are not distributions over the set of all sequences, but are subject to three separate
equations ya + ybg + ybh = 1, yc + yd = 1, ye + y f = 1. These equations express
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the revealed information to player 2 following the respective moves A, B, and C of
player 1, and can be derived systematically from the structure of the information sets
(with one equation per information set, where we have substituted some equations
such as yb = ybg +ybh for the unused nonterminal sequence b; also, player 2’s empty
sequence /0 leads here to the rightmost leaf and has constant probability y /0 = 1).
The twelve reduced strategies of player 2 are in effect the combinations of one of
the sequences a,bg,bh combined with one of c,d and one of e, f , respectively. In the
sequence form, these sequences are randomized independently. This randomization
translates to a behavior strategy, where the player randomizes locally over his moves
at each information set rather than globally over his pure strategies as in a mixed
strategy. The underlying assumption about the information sets is that of perfect
recall which says that a player does not forget what he knew or did earlier. Using the
sequence form implies the theorem of Kuhn (1953) that a player with perfect recall
can replace a mixed strategy by an equivalent behavior strategy.
In GTE, the sequence form is implemented with the path-following algorithm
of Lemke (1965) mentioned at the end of the previous section, as described by von
Stengel, van den Elzen, and Talman (2002), which starts from an arbitrary “prior”
as a starting vector and finds one equilibrium. It can be applied to relatively large
extensive games where the strategic form is hopelessly large to be used. For smaller
extensive games, an enumeration of all Nash equilibria based on the sequence form
is implemented as described by Huang (2011, Chapter 2); for a related approach see
Audet, Belhaiza, and Hansen (2009). The number of independent probabilities in
the sequence form is at most that number in the reduced strategic form. For exam-
ple, player 2 in Fig. 22 has four such independent probabilities, like ya,ybg,yc,ye , as
opposed to eleven for her reduced strategies; player 1 has four independent proba-
bilities for both sequences and reduced strategies. Huang’s approach only uses these
independent probabilities and thus keeps a low dimension of the suitably defined
best-response polyhedra, which is important for the employed vertex enumeration
algorithms that have exponential running time.
7 Software architecture and development
In this final section, we describe the architecture of the GTE software on the server
and client computers, and its development. The GTE program is open-source and part
of the Gambit project, with the goal of further integration with the existing Gambit
modules. The development is time intensive and relies on the efforts of volunteers,
where we strongly invite any interested programmer to contribute.
The GTE software is accessed by a web browser. Behind its web address runs a
server computer, which delivers a webpage and the game-drawing software of GTE
to the user’s client computer. The user can then create games, and store them on his
client computer. The game solvers for equilibrium computation reside on the server.
They are invoked by sending a description of the game from the client to the server
over the internet. When the algorithm has terminated, the server sends the text with
the computed equilibria back to the client where they are displayed.
The client program with the graphical user interface (GUI) is written in a variant
of the JavaScript programming language called ActionScript which is displayed with
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the “Flash Player”. Flash is a common software that runs as a “plug-in” on most
web browsers. We chose Flash for GTE in 2010 because of the predictability and
speed of its graphical display. However, Flash does not work on the iPad and iPhone
mobile devices (it does work on regular Apple computers), with the more universally
accepted HTML5 standard as its suggested replacement. In the future, we plan to
replace the ActionScript programs by regular JavaScript along with streamlining and
further improving the GUI part of GTE.
For security reasons, the client program requires active permission of the user
when writing or reading files on the client computer. When storing or loading a game
as a local file, this is anyhow initiated by the user and therefore causes no additional
delay. We have designed a special XML format for games in extensive or strategic
form, where XML stands for “extensible markup language” similar to the HTML
language for web pages. The tree is described by its logical structure. For example,
the leftmost leaf in Fig. 17 reached by move T is encoded as follows:
<outcome move="T">
<payoff player="1">1</payoff>
<payoff player="2">3</payoff>
</outcome>
In addition, the file contains parameters for graphical settings such as the orientation
of the game tree. The files can be converted to and from the file format used by
Gambit. The XML description is also used to encode the game for sending it to the
server for running a game solver.
Communication with the server requires identifying the user when there are dif-
ferent simultaneous client sessions, and the use of the relevant internet protocols.
These are standard methods used for typical internet transactions, which we use as
freely available routines in the Java programming language in which we have written
the server programs.
The first version of GTE was written on a publically provided server (the Google
App engine). For security reasons, all programs on that platform have to be written
in Java, and are restricted in their ability to access programs written in other pro-
gramming languages, called “native” code. In particular, we could not use the C
program lrs for vertex enumeration, which was therefore rewritten in Java. However,
this requires to duplicate in Java any improvement of lrs such as the lrsNash program
mentioned in Section 5, which is inefficient and prone to errors. In addition, it is
difficult to incorporate other game solvers. For that reason, the web server for GTE is
now provided on a university computer, and uses the original lrs code of Avis (2006).
GTE allows to compute all Nash equilibria of a two-player game, but the running
time increases exponentially with the size of the game. This means that there is a
relatively narrow range of input size (currently about 15 to 20 strategies per player)
where the efficiency of the implementation (such as a factor of ten in running time)
matters, and beyond which the computation takes an impractically long time. For
small games, the game solvers would run satisfactorily on the client using JavaScript,
although at present there are no good arbitrary precision arithmetic routines for this
programming language, apart from having to implement the algorithms separately.
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For games of “medium” size (below the “exponential barrier”), it is best to use a
state-of-the-art algorithm on the server, which works equally well for small games.
However, one problem is that computations of, say, one hour also use the com-
putational resources of the server, which degrade its performance, and which will be
slow if there are multiple such computations at the same time. Here, we provide the
option of installing the server on any local computer, which then also works inde-
pendently of an internet connection. This requires downloading and compiling the
GTE code, together with the necessary components of a Java compiler, a lightweight
server program called “Jetty” to communicate locally with the web browser, and the
(free) software for compiling the ActionScript part of GTE into an executable Flash
program. This requires time and patience, probably more so than an installation of
Gambit, but offers the same interface as that known from the web, so that the user
may find the investment worth it.
All GTE software is open source and free to use and alter under the GNU Gen-
eral Public Licence (which requires derived software to be free as well). The software
repository is at https://github.com/gambitproject/gte/wiki (including doc-
umentation), as part of the Gambit project which has long been open-source. The
version control system and collaborative tool “git” stores the current and all previous
versions of the project. Git efficiently stores snapshots of the entire project with all
modules and documentation, which can be branched off and re-merged in decentral-
ized development branches. The github repository for storing projects developed
with git is free to use for open-source software, and offers a convenient web interface
for administration and documentation.
Open-source software is the appropriate way to develop an academic project such
as GTE which has limited commercial use. Academic software should be publically
available for making computations reproducible, which is increasingly recognized as
a need for validating scientific results that rely on computation (Barnes, 2010).
On the algorithm side, one of the next steps is to integrate other existing game
solvers. Foremost among these are the algorithms already implemented in Gambit,
which should be easily incorporated via their existing file formats for input and out-
put. These include (see McKelvey, McLennan, and Turocy, 2010) algorithms for
finding Nash equilibria of more than two players with polynomial systems of equa-
tions, or via iterated polymatrix approximation (Govindan and Wilson, 2004), or sim-
plicial subdivision (van der Laan, Talman, and van der Heyden, 1987), and the recent
implementation of “action-graph games” (Jiang, Leyton-Brown, and Bhat, 2011).
Moreover, larger games should not be created manually but automatically. One focus
of the current development of Gambit is to provide better facilities for the automatic
generation of games using the Python programming language.
So far, the focus of GTE development has been to design a robust and attractive
graphical “front end” for creating and manipulating games. Such an implementation
does not count as scholarly research, so it is difficult to fund it directly with a research
grant, or to let a PhD student invest a lot of time in it. As a topic for an MSc thesis
or undergraduate programming project, usually too much time is needed to become
familiar with the existing code or the necessary background in game theory. The
Gambit project and GTE were sponsored by studentships from the “Google Sum-
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mer of Code” in 2011 and 2012. Here, the most successful projects for GTE were
those where the students could bring in their technical expertise on web graphics, for
example, to complement our background in game-theoretic algorithms.
As with open-source software in general, the development of GTE relies on the
efforts, competence, and enthusiasm of volunteers, where we were lucky to get help
from excellent students listed in the Acknowledgments. We invite and encourage any
interested programmer to contribute to this project.
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